The Royal Air Force: The First One Hundred Years by John Buckley & Paul Beaver

Author:John Buckley & Paul Beaver [Buckley, John]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780192518965
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Published: 2018-07-11T23:00:00+00:00

In response to the early war successes of German airborne forces, the British armed forces, enthusiastically endorsed by Churchill, developed their own parachute and glider units. Paradoxically, even though the Germans abandoned large-scale airborne operations in the aftermath of the Crete invasion in May 1941, the Allies pressed on and by 1943 had expanded their capacity to deploy sizeable parachute and glider forces in the invasion of Sicily.14

By the time of HUSKY, Tedder had some 2,500 Allied aircraft available to support the landings in July 1943, against which the Axis forces could muster fewer than 1,000 across the whole of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia. The Allies won air superiority over the beaches and invasion landing areas, but it was the deployment of the airborne forces that threw up the greatest difficulties. The RAF provided glider tugs as well as paratroop transporters but there were many teething problems. Inexperienced pilots, the darkness, weather, Axis flak, and a plethora of highly damaging friendly fire incidents had badly hampered the deployment of the parachute and glider forces. Indeed, the glider forces suffered so badly that they were almost withdrawn from future planning.15

Tedder and his staff made a number of recommendations to salvage the situation: gliders were better suited for surprise assaults as they allowed forces to be deployed quickly, at the right place, and in concerted fashion; prolonged planning and training was considered critical; approach routes away from friendly ground forces were preferable; rapid link-up with ground forces was vital to avoid potentially heavy losses; and use of pathfinders was encouraged. Airborne operations relied on speed of assault and accuracy of delivery to emphasize surprise, and this was the key strength of such forces. Such lessons were largely taken on board in planning the Normandy airborne attack.16

The RAF was again intimately involved in the invasion of mainland Italy in September 1943, supporting the 8th Army’s crossing of the Straits of Messina and in long-range bombing raids against Italian cities. Such raids, against which the Italians could do little, were important factors in forcing the surrender of Italy.

The vital nature of air superiority over amphibious landings was again reiterated during the Salerno and Anzio assaults in September 1943 and January 1944, respectively; air support was considerable from the RAF and the USAAF, but not at the levels that senior air officers believed could play the role that might be possible if the Luftwaffe were driven from the skies. AVALANCHE, the Salerno landings, hung in the balance for a time, and Tedder later recorded that a heavy RAF bomber attack on 14–15 September may well have saved the day. The Luftwaffe was still able to play a role in the battle even if at heavy cost; some 220 German aircraft were lost over Salerno, and many more were lost in Allied air raids across southern Italy. By late September the Luftwaffe had fled north, but for a short, vital period it had proved to be a menace to the landings.17 Air power had proved its worth, but it was too close a thing for both Eisenhower and Tedder.

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